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SCHOOL SEARCHES-A LOOK INTO THE 2 1ST CENTURY
Robert Berkley Harper*
I. INTRODUCTION
The following incidents occurred on a typical school day in an inner-city public
school:
A high school teacher observes several students alighting from school buses car-
rying their "Walkmans," small radios, and cassette tape players. Students are not
permitted to possess such music devices while in school. On the same day during a
regular class period before lunch at the high school, a teacher discovered defacement
of school property by writing with felt tip markers. The student code of conduct pro-
hibits students from bringing felt tip and other markers to school unless the markers
are required for a particular class activity. Later that morning, the teacher smells a
strong odor of marijuana smoke in two hallway areas near the school cafeteria.
Classes are in progress at the time, and no students are in the hallways.1
Would it be proper to search the pockets, bags, and/or lockers of the students at
the school because of the incidents related above?
Life in public schools has changed dramatically since this author taught mathe-
matics in the Pittsburgh Public Schools two decades ago. With the appearance of
weapons and drugs on the school scene, problems faced by school teachers and ad-
ministrators are much different from this author's job of enforcing the tardiness
code or finding gum chewers and students with incomplete homework. Today,
school officials are faced with issues of serious gravity, including bomb threats,
dangerous weapons and illegal drugs-which could result in serious injury to
school students and personnel.2
The legal status of searches and seizures in the public schools has also changed
dramatically in the past twenty years.' No longer are school officials looked upon
as parent substitutes whose major concern is serving the best interests of the stu-
dents. I Today, the role of school administrators and teachers has changed from that
of surrogate parent to that of an enforcer of the state's laws and the school's rules
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh; B.S., University of Pittsburgh, 1962; J.D., University of Pitts-
burgh, 1971 ; former algebra teacher in public schools.
1. The facts of this hypothetical problem are similar to those in Burnham v. West, 681 F Supp. 1160 (E.D.
Va. 1987), but are not intended as a reference to that opinion.
2. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), the United States Supreme Court recognized that in recent
years, school disorder has taken "particularly ugly farms" such as drug use and violent crimes. Id. at 339. "High
school principals are, more and more ... confronted with the frequent and rising use of illicit drugs and related
criminal misconduct by students." Louis A. Trosch et al., Public School Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 11
J.L. & Enuc. 41,41 (1981) [hereinafter Troschl.
3. Trosch, supra note 2, at 41.
4. Historically, courts held that school officials conduct in-school searches as in locoparentis and, therefore,
are not subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1970); In re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
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and regulations. Today's teacher is expected to investigate and collect evidence,
not only to enforce school discipline, but even in some cases to initiate criminal
prosecutions. Many recent cases have arisen that illustrate the significant change
in the role of school teacher from that of standing in loco parentis' of school chil-
dren, the role this author served in his days as a public school teacher.6 Many
school officials, however, continue to use the term in loco parentis, a term that
seems strikingly inappropriate in view of the fact that school officials' actions can
result in school expulsion and even criminal prosecution of the students.
To clarify the conflicting decisions handed down by lower courts relating to
constitutional rights of school students, the United States Supreme Court rendered
its landmark New Jersey v. TL.O. 'opinion in January, 1985. The Court reasoned
that school officials are not exempt from the dictates of the Fourth Amendment by
virtue of the special nature of their authority over school children.' In carrying out
searches and other functions pursuant to disciplinary policies mandated by state
statutes, school officials act as representatives of the state, not merely surrogates
for the parents of students.9 Teachers cannot claim the parents' immunity from the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment. 0 The Court expressed its view that the com-
mon law doctrine of in loco parentis has no application to public school officials
conducting searches of students.1 The Court held that "the Fourth Amendment
applies to searches conducted by school authorities,"12 but that under the Camara3
balancing test such a search could be conducted without a warrant and without full
probable cause. 4 In order to search school students, there must be "reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school[,]" 5 and "the mea-
5. The doctrine of in loco parentis is defined as referring to one who is "charged, factitiously, with a parent's
rights, duties and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAw DiCrIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979). See TL. 0., 469 U.S. at 332
n.2 for case authority to support this doctrine.
6. In TL. 0., the Court rejected the doctrine of in loco parentis, finding the doctrine unrealistic in the mod-
ern school setting where teachers act according to public education and disciplinary policies, not by the mandate
of individual parents. TL.0., 469 U.S. at 336-37.
7. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). Initials are commonly used to identify a minor who is a party to a lawsuit. Many
states protect the identity ofjuveniles by statute. See 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 6308 (1982). The appellee's full
name was Terry Lee Owens. David 0. Stewart, And in Her Purse the Principal Found Maijuana, 71 A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1985, at 50, 51 (hereinafter Stewart].
8. The Court recognized that the warrant requirement is suspended when the warrant "is likely to frustrate
the governmental purpose behind the search' . . . ." TL. 0., 469 U.S. at 340 (quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1969)). The probable cause standard was also dispensed with as not serving the
interest of the school authorities in maintaining order. Id.
9. Id. at 340.
10. Id. at 336-37.
11. Id. at 337. The doctrine of in loco parentis may apply where the student is away from school under the
supervision of a school teacher or administrator. See Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1987).
12. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
13. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1969).
14. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
15. Id. at 342.
(Vol. 13:293
SCHOOL SEARCHES
sures adopted [should be] reasonably related to the objectives of the search
"116
After living with TL. 0. for over eight years, one would think that school dis-
tricts and lower courts would have established clear rules as to proper searches to
be conducted in our public schools. But, as is illustrated in the opening problem of
this article, searches are being conducted by teachers and administrators without a
clear understanding of the mandates of the Constitution.17 Therefore, the purposes
of this article are to review the standard for determining the reasonableness of a
school-related search by a school official established by the United States Supreme
Court in TL. 0. and to review the Court's "balancing" of Fourth Amendment con-
stitutional rights against governmental interests. These will be followed by an in-
depth discussion of how lower courts construe the constitutional rights of public
school students as found in cases decided after TL. 0. The article will conclude
with recommendations on how courts and public school officials can balance the
interest of the school with the privacy interest of the students when confronted
with problems relating to school searches and seizures.
II. TL.O.: AN ATTEMPT TO "BALANCE"
In Brown v. Board of Education,"8 the United States Supreme Court recognized
that education is probably the most important function of state and local govern-
ments, and it is doubtful that any child can reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if denied the opportunity of an education. 9 The schools must maintain a pub-
lic school environment commensurate with the pursuit of educational goals, while
recognizing and protecting the individual rights of the participants: faculty, stu-
dents, parents, and members of the community.2 Therefore, school officials and
teachers must act in a reasonable manner in furtherance of maintaining school dis-
cipline, order, and a safe environment conducive to education.2
While school officials are responsible for maintaining an orderly and safe learn-
ing environment, they must do so without infringing on students' rights to be free
of unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.22 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District,23
stated the dilemma in this way:
When society requires large groups of students, too young to be considered capable
of mature restraint in their use of illegal substances or dangerous instrumentalities, it
assumes a duty to protect them from dangers posed by anti-social activities -their
own and those of other students- and to provide them with an environment in which
16. Id.
17. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 51.
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. Id. at 493.
20. Id.
21. See Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1984).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
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education is possible. To fulfill that duty, teachers and school administrators must
have broad supervisory and disciplinary powers. At the same time we must protect
the Fourth Amendment rights of students.24
The answer confronting society is to find the proper balance between the duty
to provide a safe learning environment on one side and the privacy afforded stu-
dents under the Fourth Amendment on the other side.
The incident prompting the Supreme Court to determine the rights of public
school students occurred on March 7, 1980, when a teacher at Piscataway High
School in Middlesex County, New Jersey, discovered two girls smoking in a lava-
tory. 25 Although at the time smoking was permitted in designated areas at the
school, the lavatory was not one of those areas .26 The teacher took the two girls to
the principal's office where they met with the Assistant Vice Principal .27 In re-
sponse to questioning by the Assistant Vice Principal investigating the incident,
one of the girls admitted that she had violated the rule and was smoking .28 Her
companion, T.L.O., however, denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory
and further claimed that she did not smoke at all.29
The Assistant Vice Principal asked T.L.O. to come into his private office and
demanded to examine her purse." After obtaining the purse, he opened it and
found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed from the purse and confronted
T.L.O. with the accusation that she had lied to him.31 While searching the purse
for the cigarettes, he noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers. a2 Seeing the
rolling papers raised his suspicions that the purse might also contain marijuana, a
substance commonly associated with rolling papers ." With these suspicions in
mind, he proceeded to search the purse thoroughly.3 4 The search was most reveal-
ing with the discovery of a small amount of marijuana, a pipe that might be used to
smoke marijuana, a number of empty plastic bags used by drug sellers, a substan-
tial quantity of money in one dollar bills, index cards that appeared to be a list of
students who owed T. L.O. money, and two letters that implicated T. L. 0. in mari-
juana dealing."
The Assistant Vice Principal called the local police and turned the evidence of
drug dealing over to them." He also called T.L.O.'s mother, who took T.L.0
24. Id. at 480.














home. 7 Later, at the request of the police, T.L.O.'s mother took her to the police
station where, after questioning, she admitted selling marijuana at the high
school.38 On the basis of her admissions and the evidence seized by the Assistant
Vice Principal, the State brought delinquency charges against T. L. 0. in Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex County.38 T.L.O. received a three-
day suspension from school for violating the smoking rules and a seven-day sus-
pension for possession of the illegal drug marijuana.4" The delinquency charges
brought by the State took three years to pass through the New Jersey state courts. 41
After passing through state courts, the first phase of T. L.O.'s case arrived at the
United States Supreme Court in 1983.42
The Supreme Court originally granted the State of New Jersey's petition for
certiorari on the question of whether the exclusionary rule operated to bar the evi-
dence in T. L. O.'s juvenile delinquency proceedings.' The State conceded for ar-
gument that the New Jersey Supreme Court had correctly decided that the search
was invalid under the Fourth Amendment, but argued that the exclusionary rule
did not apply to suppress evidence from an illegal search conducted by public au-
thorities who were not police officers." The Supreme Court did not wish to decide
this issue without first deciding the broader issue of Fourth Amendment applica-
tion to school settings. 4 The reargument on that issue resulted in the Court's at-
tempt to balance the privacy rights of public school students against the rights of
school officials to search and seize evidence.46
On January 15, 1985, the Supreme Court held that students have a legitimate
expectation of privacy, and that the Fourth Amendment constrains school officials
in searches and seizures, although to a lesser extent than it limits law enforcement
officials in similar situations . 4' The Court reasoned that school officials are not
exempt from the dictates of the Fourth Amendment by virtue of the special nature
of their authority over school children.' At first glance, one would think that the
Court was prepared to increase the privacy protection of students because Fourth
37. Id.
38. Id. at 329.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 329 n. 1.
41. Id.
42. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 464 U.S. 991 (1983).
43. Id.
44. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 331 (1985).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 333.
47. Id. at 341.
48. Id. at 340.
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Amendment protections were being considered.49 But, as will later be shown, this
was not the case.
In TL. 0., the Court carved out a new Fourth Amendment standard for applica-
tion to public school students.5" The decision tried to strike a balance among the
various state court rulings by holding, on the one hand, that the Fourth Amend-
ment does apply to school searches by school officials, and, on the other hand, by
reducing the standard for such a search to reasonable suspicion and by eliminating
the warrant requirement.5" The decision also follows the general view of the courts
that the standard for a school search is a lower one than probable cause due to the
special nature of the school setting and the governmental interest involved in pro-
viding an effective educational environment for young people.2
The two most striking aspects of the Court's opinion were its explicating a new
warrant exception" and permitting searches of school students without full proba-
ble cause." The Court dispensed with the warrant requirement because "the bur-
den of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind
the search."55 Justice White explained for the majority:
The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to school environment: requiring
a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of
school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of
the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.6
Thus, by reasoning that the "school setting requires some easing of the restrictions
to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject,"57 the Court placed
school searches within an exception to the warrant requirement and held that
school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching students who are within
their authority.58
The Court also held that school officials may search a student- even without a
warrant -without showing traditional probable cause for the search. " The Court
49. Although juveniles have not been given all the rights contained in the Bill of Rights as have adults, it is
clear that the Supreme Court has favored the expansion of constitutional rights afforded to juveniles as students in
many areas. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (prohibition ofdouble jeopardy); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975) (procedural due process in civil contexts); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (various
substantive and procedural rights in juvenile court proceedings, including requirement of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (free speech); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to notice, counsel, confrontation and cross-examination, and not to incriminate
oneself); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (equal protection against racial discrimination);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (freedom of religion).
50. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 333.
51. Id. at 340.
52. See, e.g., State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Nelson v. State, 319 So. 2d 154 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Young, 216 S.E.2d 586 (Ga. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975).
53. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.




59. Id. at 341.
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found that the need of teachers and administrators to maintain order in the schools
permitted the Court to reduce the probable cause standard to that of "reasonable
suspicion."" The Court stated that the higher probable cause standard which po-
lice must follow is unsuited to the school environment. 1 The Court analyzed the
requirement of probable cause in the same manner as it did with the warrant re-
quirement; it concluded that these higher standards would impede school officials
in pursuit of educational objectives.62 In using the reasonableness standard, a two-
part analytical process must be followed. First, was the search justified at its in-
ception - in other words, did the searcher have reasonable suspicion? Second, was
the search reasonable in scope -in other words, was the search more intrusive
than was necessary? The Supreme Court then applied its newly established test to
the facts of the TL. 0. case.63
In applying its standard to the facts before it, the majority in TL. 0. reversed the
New Jersey Supreme Court and upheld the validity of the actions of the Assistant
Vice Principal.' The Court justified the initial search for cigarettes, which the As-
sistant Vice Principal suspected would be in the purse based on the teacher's report
that T. L. 0. had been smoking in the lavatory, as a reasonable attempt to provide an
evidentiary basis to support the alleged offense.65 Moreover, the Court felt the
presence of cigarettes in her purse discredited T.L.O.'s claims that she neither
smoked in the lavatory nor smoked at all.66 Having justified the initial intrusion,
the Court found that the Assistant Vice Principal reasonably conducted the subse-
quent intrusions .67 The discovery of the rolling papers gave rise to a "reasonable
suspicion" that T.L.O. was carrying marijuana in addition to cigarettes.'a The dis-
covery of the pipe, empty plastic bags, marijuana and money were fruits of the
legal search for the contraband, marijuana. 69 The'discovery of this additional evi-
dence justified opening the zippered compartment in T.L.O.'s purse and reading
the index cards and the letters that were found there.7" Thus, the Court found that
all the evidence discovered was admissible as the fruits of a lawful search and sei-
zure.
71
60. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Although never expressly used by the Terry majority,
"reasonable suspicion" became the term associated with the quantum of evidence that the Court found necessary
to conduct a stop-and-frisk. The term "reasonable suspicion" was first used by Justice Harlan in his concurring
opinion in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a companion case to Terry. Justice Harlan said: "Under the
decision in Terry a right to stop may indeed be premised on reasonable suspicion and does not require probable
cause . . . ." Sibron, 392 U.S at 71 (Harlan, J., concurring). See Jacob W. Landynski, The Supreme Court's
Search for Fourth Amendment Standards: The Problem of Stop and Frisk, 45 CONN. B.J. 146, 156 (1971).
61. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
62. Id. at 340.
63. Id. at 343.
64. Id. at 348.
65. Id. at 345.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 347.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 348.
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III. WERE STUDENTS' RIGHTS BALANCED OR SKEWED
BY THE COURT IN TL.O. ?
In TL. 0., the Supreme Court balanced away the probable cause requirement of
the Fourth Amendment and effectively rewrote the amendment to render the war-
rant clause inapplicable.72 The Court proposed the "reasonableness standard" be-
cause the higher probable cause standard which police must follow is unsuited to
the school environment." The Court stated that requiring a search warrant and/or
probable cause would "interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools."74 The better rule, the Court held,
is that "the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reason-
ableness, under all the circumstances of the search."'I
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurring opinion in TL. 0. emphasizing
that the Court missed a "crucial step" in its analysis.7" According to Justice Black-
mun, the Court may only employ a balancing test when "special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause require-
ment impracticable."77 But Justice Blackmun concluded, as did the majority, that
the school setting presented such special needs for immediate action by school of-
ficials.78
Justice Blackmun and the majority in TL. 0. did not clearly explain why such
special needs exist in public school settings. Nor did they attempt to review general
rules of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to develop this important concept.
They merely cited Camara v. Municipal Court79 and Terry v. Ohio8" for the propo-
sition that determining the reasonableness of a search requires a balancing of the
need to search against the privacy invasion of those who are the subject of the
search.81 The Court then applied the balancing test discussed in these two cases
and concluded that relaxation of the probable cause requirement for school
searches was appropriate.82
The reliance on Camara is misplaced, however, because Camara involved a
unique kind of search.' In Camara, the Court used a balancing test only in light of
its determination that it could not adequately protect the particular governmental
interests involved if it required individualized suspicion." In order to permit rou-
tine housing safety inspections based on less than probable cause, the Court
72. Id.
73. Id. at 340.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 341.
76. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 356.
79. 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
80. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
81. TL. 0., 469 U.S. at 340; TL. 0., 469 U.S. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 340.




adopted a test whereby they balanced the government's need to search against the
intrusiveness of the search.85 The Court held that a governmental unit could use a
lesser standard for administrative inspections than is necessary for a criminal in-
vestigation." The Court's justification in Camara was threefold: first, such in-
spection programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance; second,
the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated;
and last, because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the
discovery of evidence of a crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the
urban citizen's privacy.87 None of the justifications are present in TL. 0. to require
the lessening of Fourth Amendment requirements.
Furthermore, the TL. 0. Court's approach ignored Camara's explicit statement
that "'probable cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is
tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness.1"88 Even more glaring
is the fact that Camara held that where a citizen refused to permit the search, the
governmental official would have to obtain a warrant. 89 A public school student
has no such right. Camara's special rule was established to govern the area of
unique investigative techniques, similar to housing inspections, where a less de-
manding probable cause test is appropriate. 90 The Court held that this lesser cause
exists to obtain a warrant based upon the fact that reasonable legislative or admin-
istrative standards for conducting an area inspection are present with respect to a
particular building.91
Terry v. Ohio,92 the other major Fourth Amendment case relied upon by the
Court in TL. 0., employed a reasonableness analysis rather than a conventional
analysis.9 3 The Terry94 Court applied a balancing test to determine the reasonable-
ness of the governmental actions in stopping and frisking a citizen in the Cleve-
land, Ohio, area. The Court balanced the governmental interests in crime
detection and protecting officers' safety against an individual's right to personal
security and freedom from arbitrary governmental interference.9 " The balancing
process weighed three factors: the public interest of the intrusion, the extent of the
intrusion into one's privacy, and the extent the intrusion advances the public inter-
est.9" The Court justified this exception on the grounds that detention is less intru-
85. Id. at 540.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 528-31.
88. Id. at 534.
89. Id. at 540. In See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court gave less protection for inspection of
businesses.
90. YALE KAmi.sAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 400 (1986) [hereinafter KAMISAR].
91. Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
92. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
93. Id. at 30.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
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sive than an arrest, and the search is necessary to protect the officer's safety. 7
When an officer is investigating an incident where criminal activity is afoot, that
officer may protect his own safety by frisking for weapons if he has a reasonable
suspicion that the detained person may possess a deadly weapon. 8
According to Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority in Terry, the revolu-
tionary new exception to probable cause was to be applied only in very limited cir-
cumstances. " He stated that the "sole justification" for the new standard was to
protect the police officer and others in his immediate vicinity and that any search
must be "confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns,
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.""'
The Terry holding was a practical solution to the daily dangers faced by law en-
forcement officers on the streets of major cities throughout the United States. The
holding that a "stop-and-frisk" can be predicated on less than probable cause is an
important attempt to provide the necessary tools to minimize those dangers faced
by law enforcement personnel as they fight "street crimes."0 1
In both cases, the law enforcement objective did not relate to gathering evi-
dence of criminal conduct; moreover, it would have been impracticable to require
a warrant and probable cause. Camara, in effect, replaced probable cause with a
reasonable standard for administrative inspections by balancing societal interests
and needs versus a slight invasion of individual privacy and retaining the warrant
requirement except in cases of emergencies. In Terry, the Court recognized that
dispensing with the warrant and probable cause requirements in "stop-and-
frisk"10 2 scenarios is justified by the practical needs of law enforcement. An offi-
cer has no time to obtain a warrant, and, confronted with a potentially dangerous
situation, he should not be required to meet the higher standard of probable cause
before he can take limited action to protect himself."0 3 In TL. 0., however, the
Court has not shown that schools are unable to achieve their goals of enforcing
rules within the confines of the Fourth Amendment.
The "reasonableness, under all the circumstances" criterion, as articulated and
applied by the TL. 0. Court to full-scale personal searches of students by teachers,
may give even less protection than the "reasonable suspicion" test of Terry v.
97. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-27.
98. Id.
99. The Court indicated the limitation of the Terry holding, noting:
[The] narrow question posed by the facts. . . [is] whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to
seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for arrest.
Given the narrowness of this question, we have no occasion to canvass in detail the constitutional limits
upon the scope of a policeman's power when he confronts a citizen without probable cause to arrest him.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 15-16.
1O0.1d. at29.
101. Moreover, Chief Justice Warren reiterated for the Court that the protections created by the Fourth
Amendment must be preserved by stating that the police 'must whenever practical obtain advance judicial ap-
proval of searches and seizures." Id. at 20 (footnotes omitted). The Court added "that in most instances failure to
comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances." Id.
102. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
103. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
[Vol. 13:293
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Ohio,1"4 and similar cases. A reasonableness analysis is appropriate where the
only effective search must be warrantless and not based on probable cause.' 05 This
is not always the case for school searches. A clear example is illustrated by the
problem used as an introduction to this article. The search for evidence in the
problem does not demonstrate an emergency situation because all the infractions
had been committed in the past, and, thus, there is no future danger as in Terry or
Camara.
The TL. 0. Court skewed the balance in favor of the state with respect to
searches of students. On the side of the balance designated as the state's interest,
the Court weighed the state's need for efficient law enforcement rather than the
types of special governmental interests that are ordinarily required to deviate from
the probable cause standard. 106 In fact, the vast majority of schools do not have the
drug and violence problems cited by the majority. 07 In any case, the presence of
such problems alone cannotjustify abandoning the usual Fourth Amendment safe-
guards.108 The Court assumed that school officials would be unable to fulfill their
education mission if they were subject to the same Fourth Amendment require-
ment as law enforcement officials. 09 This assumption is unsupported and proba-
bly incorrect; school officials could likely maintain school discipline despite the
probable cause requirement.' 0 In weighing the competing interests of the individ-
ual and the state, the TL. 0. Court should have focused more on the infringement
of the individual's privacy right and less on the government's need to search.11
IV. THE FACTOR MISSING IN THE TL. 0. BALANCE:
INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court had TL. 0. reargued because it felt
that it was more important to decide the reasonableness of the search in the case
than the issue of the application of the exclusionary rule to public school stu-
104. 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (officer may briefly stop and frisk persons for weapons based on individualized
reasonable suspicion and concern for safety of officer).
105. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
106. Id. at 363. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107. John C. Hogan & Mortimer D. Schwartz, The Fourth Amendment and the Public Schools, 7 WHITTtER L.
REv. 527, 547 (1985).
108. KAMISAR, supra note 90, at 408 (focus should be on maintenance of proper educational environment).
109. TL.O, 469 U.S. at 340-41.
110. Dale Edward F.T. Zane, Note, School Searches Under the Fourth Amendment: New Jersey v. T.L.O., 72
CORNELL L. REV. 368, 391 (1987) [hereinafter Zane].
111. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in TL. 0., argued that the balancing test adopted by the majority risks evis-
cerating the protections of the Fourth Amendment subordinating personal privacy to social utility. TL. 0., 469
U.S. at 354 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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dents. 12 Several other issues were expressly excluded from the TL.O. decision,113
the most important of which is the question of individualized suspicion as an es-
sential element of the reasonableness standard for school searches.114 The underly-
ing command of the Fourth Amendment has always been that searches and
seizures be reasonable. "1 The reasonableness standard usually requires, at a mini-
mum, that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement
against "an objective" standard, whether this be probable cause or a less stringent
standard." 6 The searcher must have a belief based upon reason that evidence may
be found at a particular place. '17 To permit searches on mere generalized suspicion
would vitiate the principles that are the underpinnings of the Fourth Amend-
ment. "I Searches based on mere suspicion that a crime or infraction has occurred
offer no protection to the legitimate expectation of privacy held by each member
of the student body of public schools and violates the express command of the
Constitution. "9
Because the individualized suspicion requirement was left open by TL. .,120
some school authorities believe that they have the right to search on a general sus-
picion of wrongdoing.' 21 However, to permit a school administrator or teacher to
search so long as he or she has reasonable cause to believe that a law or a school
rule has been violated by a person in a group of students does not furnish an objec-
tive standard that will safeguard the individual student's privacy interest. Reason-
able cause to believe-or even certainty-that a violation of rule or law has
occurred is no safeguard; instead, when standing alone, it serves merely as an in-
vitation for impermissibly broad searches at the whim of school officials.' 22 It is
112. See supru note 44.
113. Specifically, the TL.O. Court noted issues not decided by the case, but relegated discussion of these is-
sues to footnotes. TL. 0., 469 U.S. at 333-42 nn.3-8.
By his own admission, Justice White, author of the TL. 0. majority opinion, provided a list of issues not ad-
dressed: (1) Does the exclusionary rule apply to the fruits of an unlawful search in the public school? Id. at 332
n.2. (2) Do students have privacy rights in connection with their lockers, desks or other storage areas the school
provides? If so, what are the standards for searching these areas? Id. at 337 n.5. (3) Do the standards change if
the police are involved? Id. at 341 n.7. (4) Is it necessary to have individualized suspicion before a search takes
place? Id. at 342 n. 8.
114. Id. at 342. The Court recently sidestepped this issue again in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)
(search of employees by public employers).
115. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
116. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
117. Id. at 661.
118. Any major intrusion of citizens by governmental officials comes within the protection of the Fourth
Amendment which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
119. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8.
120. Id.
121. See problem in Introduction where a mass search did occur just as one did in Burnham v. West, 681 F.
Supp. 1160 (E.D. Va. 1987).
122. See Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an Individualized Suspicion
Requiremzent for Valid Searches and Seizures in the Schools, 22 GA. L. REv. 897 (1988) [hereinafter Gardner].
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sad to admit, but some school officials continue to conduct general searches within
public schools.123
In most contexts, the Fourth Amendment requires individual suspicion in cases
where adults are the subject of searches. 24 Individual suspicion is required in
cases of "stop-and-frisk" because an officer must believe that "an individual is
armed and dangerous" before a frisk (search for weapons) is permitted. 125 Courts
have held that individual suspicion is required in the mass drug testing context
generally. 12 Individual suspicion is even required in the prison setting, at least
with regard to strip searches of visitors.127 Is it not just as important to strike the
balance in favor of individualized suspicion with respect to searches conducted in
the public school settings? 2' Without individualized suspicion, teachers and ad-
ministrators are permitted to search on bare suspicion that a crime or infraction
has occurred, thus granting them powers beyond that granted for searches of
adults."29
Although the TL. 0. Court did not decide whether its "reasonable suspicion'
standard included individual suspicion, it did strongly imply that individualized
suspicion may be required under the Fourth Amendment. 30 The Court said: "Ex-
ceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally appropriate
only where the privacy interest implicated by a search are minimal and where
'other safeguards' are available 'to assure that the individual's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy is not "subject to the discretion of the official in the field."' "131
This statement reminds us that individualized suspicion as a requirement for a
valid search of students is of keen jurisprudential significance. 132
The requirement of individualized suspicion as an essential element of the rea-
sonableness standard would not tie the hands of school officials in emergency situ-
ations. Although "some quantum of individual suspicion is usually a prerequisite
to a constitutional search[,] . . . the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible
123. See supra note I and accompanying text.
124. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985).
125. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
126. Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 587-92 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (analyzing cases and holding
general drug testing of police academy cadets unreasonable).
127. Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 675 (8th Cir. 1982) (reasonable suspicion must be aimed at the particular
strip search candidate).
128. This proposition is in accord with many recent decisions. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist.,
690 F.2d 470, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist.,
499 F. Supp. 223, 234 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F Supp. 47, 54 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Kuehn v.
Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 694 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Wash. 1985).
129. One court has explained the significance of how individualized suspicion relates to the constitutionality of
a search: "In any sufficiently large group, there is a statistical probability that someone will have contraband in
his possession. The Fourth Amendment demands more than a generalized probability; it requires that the suspi-
cion be particularized with respect to each individual searched." Kuehn, 694 P.2d at 1081.
130. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985).
131. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979) (emphasis added)).
132. See Gardner, supra note 122, at 926; Jill 1. Braverman, Public Sehool Drug Searches: Toward Redefining
Fourth Amendment 'Reasonableness"to Include Individualized Suspicion, 14 FORDHAm URa. L.J. 629,683 (1986)
("Public school attendance, which is mandated by state education laws, should not automatically subject students
to severe encroachments upon their constitutionally protected expectations of privacy.").
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"1133requirement of such suspicion. For example, a different result might be ob-
tained where a school official was notified that a bomb was located in a locker or a
teacher saw a handgun brandished in the midst of a crowd of students. Here, the
immediate and serious risk of harm could be determinative in balancing the inter-
ests at stake.134 Although the Court recognized students' privacy rights in TL. 0.,
the decision may have negative effects, because it permits searches based upon a
violation of a "school rule," as well as criminal law violations.
Justice White must have been aware of this point when, in response to the dis-
senting statements of Justice Stevens, he wrote for the majority:
We are unwilling to adopt a standard under which the legality of a search is depen-
dent upon a judge's evaluation of the relative importance of various school rules
., *,The promulgation of a rule forbidding specified conduct presumably reflects a
judgment on the part of school officials that such conduct is destructive of school or-
der or of a proper education environment. Absent any suggestion that the rule vio-
lates some substantive constitutional guarantee, the courts should, as a general
matter, defer to the judgment and refrain from attempting to distinguish between
rules that are important to the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are
not. 135
This statement by Justice White is irreconcilable with the Court's earlier hold-
ing which tests the need "to search against the invasion which the search en-
tails."136 The invasion is now permitted where the school rule, made by teachers
and administrators, serves as the bases for their own searches.137 The decision of
the Court to permit a search to enforce "any school rule" will grant school officials
wide latitude to search. Thus, under TL. 0., a teacher is allowed to make a search
or frisk on the playground while an officer would not be allowed to make the same
search on the streets. The Court seems to be granting broader power to search on
the basis of the status relationship between the searcher and searchee as opposed
to a clear objective as to the fruits of the search. By granting authority to search in
all cases of school rule infractions and declining to impose the requirement of indi-
vidualized suspicion for searches, the Court has struck a balance that is not only
unfair to students but also likely to be vague and unclear to school officials and
lower courts.
This decision "generally" permits no judicial evaluation of the purpose of such a
school rule in determining the reasonableness of a search.' The holding places
133. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976).
134. Compare United States v. Doe, 819 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1985) (warrantless entry into residence justified by
officer's reasonable, good faith belief that substantial risk of harm justified immediate search for weapon) with
United States v. Costa, 356 F Supp. 606 (D.D.C.), affd, 479 F2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (narcotics definitely
dangerous but not so immediately dangerous as to justify warrantless entry); see generally New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public safety exception to Miranda requirement based on presence of weapon).
135. TL. 0., 469 U.S. at 342-43 n.9 (citations omitted).
136. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
137. This standard is much different than was the case of Camara where the search was based on legislative or
administrative standards. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
138. TL. O.. 469 U.S. at 342 n.9.
[Vol. 13:293
SCHOOL SEARCHES
enormous unchecked authority in the hands of the drafters of school rules and
those school officials charged with implementing such rules. The Court would
permit a school official to conduct a full-scale search to enforce school rules regu-
lating such an innocuous item as the dress code. 139 The Court's willingness to defer
to school rules as a basis for the search of a student seems unsound. School rules
are an informally created, widely varied set of principles established by members
of the school community to aid in governing the educational process in the
schools.140 The persons who formulate these rules are not elected by the people
generally, and they are not regulated in their task by the legislature.141 There may
be no member present who has any formal training in the law and understands the
legal protections granted to students. 142 To permit a search for evidence for viola-
tions of any rules - rules which are often limitless in number and of varying impor-
tance and of which the searcher is the author -is virtually an open-ended right
granted to school officials to search at will."
The Court should have limited its holding to school rules disciplining conduct
highly disruptive of the educational process. The standard, as stated by the Court,
would permit searches based on reasonable suspicion of the violation of trivial
school rules like the dress code. 1" While most school rules arguably are created to
promote order, many rules only indirectly serve this purpose. 145 Searching a
locker or bag for a "Walkman" that in no way relates to the educational function
being conducted in school may destroy any protection granted by the Fourth
Amendment. 1
The school setting is the place where we want students to understand the "rule of
law" and what democracy is all about.147 The freedom granted school officials to
search students is particularly unfortunate because although society wants students
to respect the law, their status as students seems to afford them less constitutional
protection and privacy than other citizens. 1" Students generally enjoy full Fourth
Amendment protection away from school premises. 149 Once in school, however,
139. Id. at 377 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. Zane, supra note 110, at 392.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. TL. 0., 469 U.S. at 328. Although the Court recognized students' privacy rights, its approach to permit
searches based on reasonable suspicion of the violation of the most trivial school rules may ultimately destroy
these rights to students. Zane, supra note 110, at 392.
144. TL. 0., 469 U.S. at 377 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145. Zane, supra note 110, at 392.
146. See supra note I and accompanying text. See also Charlotte H. Purkey, Comment, Fourth Amendment Pro-
tections in the Elementary and Secondary School Settings, 38 MERcER L. Rav. 1417, 1437 (1987) (The vague defi-
nition surrounding "reasonable cause" creates a murky region where there is a potential for discretionary abuse
by school officials.); Michael J. Hickman, Comment, 7he Supreme Court and the Decline of Students' Constitu-
tional Rights: A Selective Analysis, 65 NEB. L. REv. 161, 179 (1986) ("The amorphous nature of the reasonable-
ness standard could lead to searches that may be based upon unfounded rumor or arbitrary objective signs, such
as the style of a student's hair or clothing, those persons a student associates with, or even race.").
147. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
148. Id. at 385-86 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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they may be subject to full-scale searches by school officials under a reasonable
suspicion standard as viewed by some courts and school administrators. This
clearly violates the Tinker15 maxim that students do not shed their rights at the
schoolhouse gate.151
V. LowER COURT CASES AFTER TL. 0.
While the majority in TL. 0. acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment is ap-
plicable in a school environment, it is significant that the burden of defining the
potential reach of the Court's decision will lay heavily upon those who find them-
selves in opposition to school authority. Under the Court's standard, one plausible
interpretation of the TL. 0. standard, without the factor of individualized suspi-
cion, is that it is designed to prohibit those searches undertaken without any evi-
dence whatsoever supportive of a suspicion that the search will turn up evidence of
a violation. Under this interpretation, only the totally baseless search would be
prohibited. Thus, a search would be permitted if there is any basis whatsoever to
support the search. But if a requirement of individualized suspicion is read into the
TL. 0. requirements, searches of public school students would be permitted only
in those cases that a school official has a reasonable belief that a particular student
has violated the law or a school rule.
There have been over forty state court cases and twenty federal cases following
the TL. 0. decision. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss all cases litigated
after TL. 0., but to give the reader a sense as to how lower courts have interpreted
the decision. A review of several lower court cases will show how courts have in-
terpreted TL. 0. over the past seven years.
In State v. Joseph T,"' an assistant principal at a middle school noticed the
smell of alcohol on the breath of an eighth grade student. 15 3 The student admitted
upon questioning that he had consumed alcohol at a second student's home on the
way to school that morning. " The Vice Principal then became suspicious that the
second student may have brought some alcohol to school with him. 55 He directed
two teachers to open the second student's locker 6 with a master key while the
Vice Principal talked with the second student in his office. 5 7 The teachers could
see no alcohol, but they searched the student's jacket and found three wooden
pipes, wrapping papers, and a plastic box. 58 The box contained seven handrolled
marijuana cigarettes. 5 9 The teachers then replaced the items in the locker, sum-
moned the student and Vice Principal, and the search was repeated in the student's
150. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
151. Id. at 506.
152. 336 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1985).
153. Id. at 730.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Locker searches were left open by the Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 n.5. (1985).





presence.160 On the basis of the marijuana revealed in the search, the county cir-
cuit court adjudged the student a "delinquent child" under state law. 161 The student
appealed, contending that the search of his locker was unlawful. 162 The West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court held that the search was consistent with the principles laid
down by New Jersey v. TL. Q.163 The West Virginia court stated that if a school of-
ficial has information that a student consumed alcohol at another student's home in
the morning, and the first student smells of alcohol, then the school official has the
necessary "reasonable suspicion" that the other student has alcohol in his locker. 164
The validity of the violation in Joseph T goes without question based upon the
crime of furnishing alcohol to a minor. But, once the violation was reported- that
a student consumed alcohol at another student's home on the way to school - did it
create reasonable cause to believe that alcohol was brought to school? Even more
grievous is the scope of the search in this case. Looking into a student's locker for
alcohol and not seeing or smelling any, the teacher searched the jacket pockets and
even a closed container found in the pocket. 165 A bottle or can of alcohol can easily
be found due to the size and shape without reaching into pockets and removing the
contents. The taking, from the jacket pockets, of wrapping papers and a plastic
box and searching the box, goes beyond the visual observations leading to the
search in TL. 0.166
It seems that the West Virginia Supreme Court has granted school officials
sweeping powers to search students. It seems as if the authority to search students
is even greater than that granted in TL. 0. The granting of such broad power to
search, coupled with the extremely broad scope of the search, may well produce a
synergistic effect to the detriment of students.
Another case that demonstrates the impact of the TL. 0. decision is the Califor-
nia case In re Bobby B. 167 The case was decided after TL. 0., and the court used
the TL. 0. holdings to support its decision. 66 The case illustrates the extent to
which state courts have granted school officials authority to conduct searches of
students. 
169
The Administrative Boys' Dean at a high school in Los Angeles made his morn-
ing rounds which included checking the restrooms for students who were not au-
160. Id.
161. Id. at 731.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 736. The Court did not reach the issue whether the exclusionary rule applies to school students. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 730.
166. Although the majority in TL. 0. held that the presence of cigarette papers gave cause to continue the
search, Justice Brennan disagrees: "The mere presence without more of such a staple item of commerce is insuf-
ficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in inferring both that T.L.O. had violated the law by possessing
marijuana and that evidence of that violation would be found in her purse." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
368-69 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. 218 Cal. Rptr. 253 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
168. Id. at 255.
169. Id.
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thorized to be outside their classrooms.17 He entered one of the restrooms and
found Bobby B. with another boy.171 He asked the boys to show him their passes
for permission to be out of class, but according to him, neither boy produced a
pass.172 His suspicion was aroused because Bobby B. appeared to be searching for
answers to the simple questions he asked.173 The Dean was also aware of narcot-
ics, especially marijuana activity, within the restrooms at the school.174 He then
told Bobby B. to take everything out of his pockets, because he "was looking for
pot."I7" The Dean found two cigarettes that appeared to be marijuana and a bundle
of cocaine which was located in Bobby B.'s wallet.
176
Interestingly, at the juvenile court hearing it was found that the defendant's
name was on a pass along with the other student who was in the restroom and that
the pass was in their possession at the time of the questioning by the Dean. 177 It is
also interesting to note that the contraband was found inside the wallet of Bobby B.
after he was made to empty his pockets. 7 There is no evidence to suggest, as was
the case in TL. 0., that marijuana was located in the student's wallet.179 However,
the court found no violations of the defendant's rights as to this search and permit-
ted the introduction of the contraband found by the school official. 80
The court stated that in applying the two-prong test of New Jersey v. TL. 0., the
conduct of the Dean in conducting the search was justified from its inception.' 8
Because the defendant was in the restroom without a pass and was nervous or
looked nervous, coupled with the belief of the administrator that there were drugs
on campus, was enough to justify the search. 8 2 The court found it proper for the
administrator to make rounds and inspect for drug use in the restrooms and ask
questions that led to the search.1 83 As to the second prong of TL. 0., whether the
search was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the in-
terference in the first place, the court said "we cannot fault either his reasonable
suspicion or the method of the search."" The court further stated: "To do other-
wise would be an illogical invasion of his [the administrator's] duty to check on
drug use on campus." 8










180. Id. at 256.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 255.
183. Id.




This case clearly reminds one of the facts in TL. 0. because the information
given for the search was that T. L. 0. was smoking in the restroom. 186 How did the
teacher happen to "catch" the students in the act of smoking in the restroom? If the
students' expectation of privacy does not extend to the restrooms, there may be
very little protection as it relates to their personal dignity. The issue of privacy in
school restrooms was ignored by the courts at all levels in the State of New Jersey
as TL. 0. proceeded to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The issue of privacy in restrooms was first raised by Justice Stevens during the
TL. 0. oral arguments. 87 He elicited from the New Jersey's Deputy Attorney
General that school officials could install two-way mirrors in a restroom if they
suspected that students were smoking cigarettes. " Justice Rehnquist commented:
"I don't know why two-way mirrors in a restroom would be a violation of pri-
vacy."189 To this Justice Stevens questioned, "Is there no expectation of privacy in a
restroom?"190 By not addressing this most important issue, TL. 0. increases the
authority of teachers and administrators to "spy" on students, thus, establishing
cause to search. 9' The Court has established a concept of "no privacy" as to the
observations by school personnel of students, thus giving wide discretion to school
officials at the expense of the privacy rights of students.192
The telling statement of In re Bobby B. is in the court's comment: "To do other-
wise would be an illogical invasion of [one's] . . . duty to check on drug use on
campus." 9 ' Professor Saltzburg said that the great victim of drug abuse is the
Fourth Amendment. 194 The California court has granted school officials authority
to search based upon the fact that drug use occurs in our schools and a student
gives a faltering or evasive answer to the official's question.19 5 Searching innocent
students is considered to be an unfortunate side effect of the effort to keep our
schools drug free. 196 This is clearly the view of this California court which sug-
gests the worst regarding school students.
In Irby v. State,197 a teacher informed the Associate Principal of the high school
that she heard some students talking about a student (the unidentified informant)
186. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).




191. See Stern v. New Haven Community Sch., 529 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (use of two-way mirror in
school lavatory to observe drug sale upheld).
192. Justice Stevens was concerned in T L. 0. that the test established was designed to protect against "obvi-
ously unreasonable intrusions" but on the other hand may not offer effective protection because it is too flexible.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 381. The reasonable suspicion standard, "subjectively applied by a school
official[,] . . . is really no standard at all." State v. Young, 216 S.E.2d 586, 599 (Ga. 1975) (Gunter, J., dissent-
ing).
193. In re Bobby B., 218 Cal. Rptr. 253,256 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
194. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustrated by the
Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Prr. L. REv. 1 (1986).
195. In re Bobby B., 218 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
196. Id. at 256.
197. 751 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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who had marijuana with him at school, and she sent the student to the Associate
Principal's office. "8 When the student gave the marijuana to the Associate Princi-
pal, he was asked where he got the marijuana.9" He said that Sean Irby had given
it to him. 200 Sean was seventeen years old and in the eleventh grade at the time of
the incident. 21 The Associate Principal went to Sean's classroom and brought him
to the office.202 He was questioned in the presence of two school officials and told
that they had reason to believe that he had marijuana on him and asked if he would
mind being searched. 2 3 He said" ' "No." '"..204 One official looked through the
contents of his pockets that he placed on the desk and the other official went
through his coat.205 Marijuana was found concealed in the lining of his coat.206
The court found that the search was justified at its inception by reasonable
grounds for suspecting the search would discover evidence that the student was
carrying marijuana in violation of the law and also in violation of the school's
rules.20 7 In looking for the drug marijuana, the court found that the search of the
student's jacket was reasonable and not excessively intrusive. 2 8 The school offi-
cials would not reveal to the student the name of the other student claiming to have
gotten the marijuana from him. 20 ' The court held that it was not necessary for the
school administrator to disclose the name of the unidentified student informant.
210
Police officers often act upon information from informants that crimes are
about to be or have been committed. This privilege has been established to permit
officers to carry out their oath to protect society by investigating crimes and cap-
turing criminals. But police officers must act upon information from informants
that evidence will be located at a particular place.21 Just because a student is found
with marijuana and tells school officials that he had gotten it from another student,
is there evidence that the second student has marijuana on his person?
School officials are granted broad power to search if they are permitted to
search a student merely on the basis of another student's statement that contraband
was received. Moreover, allowing school officials to act upon information from
alleged unnamed student informers may arm them with authority to search on the
basis of hearsay or even mere rumor. Even worse, it may cause school officials to
view their jobs as that of police officers as did the Associate Principal in Irby and













211. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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extend the scope of the search to include even the lining of the coats of school stu-
dents.
2 12
Many cases have arisen that relate to the scope of the search by school officials,
permitted in the second prong of the TL. 0. test. In Shamberg v. State,213 the
"safety/security home-school coordinator" was informed by a teacher that a stu-
dent was suspected of being under the influence of alcohol. 214 He approached the
student in the library and noticed the student's eyes were glassy and his face was
flushed. 215 He asked the student to accompany him to a storeroom to talk, but as
they walked to the storeroom the student bounced into large objects and swayed as
he walked.215 In the storeroom, the school official detected an odor of alcohol and
noticed the student's speech was slightly slurred.217
He asked the student where he had gone for lunch and if he had driven his car.218
The student's evasive response gave rise to suspicion to search the student's car.
219
The search of the car included searching under the seats, under the dashboard, in
the glove compartment, and in the ashtray. 22 In the ashtray there were two baggies
that contained a white powdery substance.221 Chemical tests proved that the sub-
stance found was cocaine. 
222
The court held that since the school official knew that the student was under the
influence of some intoxicant and the student gave evasive responses regarding his
car, this led to a common sense conclusion that the student had been consuming or
transporting alcohol or drugs in his car. 223 The court also noted that the car was
improperly parked on school property, which enhanced the reasonable suspicion
of the searcher.224 But could it be reasonable that since the student knew that his
car was improperly parked, that this led to the evasive response to questioning
about his car more clearly than the fact that there was contraband in the car?
Even if the search was justified at its inception, there arose an important issue
as to the scope of the search. Was it reasonable to search the ashtray of the car? An
alcohol container would not fit into an ashtray, thus searching for alcohol would
not give justification for a search of the ashtray of a car. 22 The court found that the
student was suspected to be under the influence of other drugs in addition to alco-
212. See Wynn v. Board of Educ., 508 So. 2d 1170 (Ala. 1987) (approving the search by a teacher who, at-
tempting to recover six dollars, had students remove their shoes while she felt their socks for the money).
213. 762 P.2d 488 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
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hol.228 The basis for this suspicion was the degree of the student's impairment and
the short length of the lunch period"27 A school official could reasonably believe
that forty minutes was not enough time to ingest enough alcohol to reach that level
of intoxication as displayed by the student.228
Thus the court reasoned that suspicion would be well founded to search for ille-
gal drugs as well as for alcohol. 29 The evidence of the student's drug or alcohol use
supported a reasonable suspicion that the ashtray was the repository for drugs.23
But is this conclusion correct? Do alcohol and drugs cause similar reactions to in-
dividuals? Is it reasonable that a high school student could consume enough alco-
hol in forty minutes to be highly intoxicated? The court went out of its way to
approve the search in this case because drugs were found. Similar results can be
found in other jurisdictions to approve searches without clearly following the
guidelines of TL. 0.
So far, lower court cases have been reviewed from West Virginia, California,
Texas, and Alaska. These cases illustrate that there are often very few restrictions
on school officials conducting searches. One may conclude that there is to be a
general pattern to grant greater authority to school officials to search students, and
the scope of the search is without restrictions. The cause to search and the scope of
a school search is clearly seen in the problem used in the Introduction to the article.
The introductory problem was adapted from the facts in Burnham v. West,2"' and
the court's discussion in that case is most relevent to our review.
In Burnham, Dr. Roy West, principal of a high school, discovered defacement
of school property by felt-tip markers and directed the teachers to search students'
bookbags, pockets and pocketbooks for similar markers.232 Under the school
rules, students were not permitted to have felt-tip markers on school property un-
less the markers were required in a particular class.23 Teachers proceeded to look
into bookbags and pocketbooks, and required boys to turn their pockets inside
out.2" There is no evidence that any student was physically touched during the
search. 2
35
. The next month, a teacher told Dr. West that she had observed several students
alighting from school buses carrying "Walkmen" or radios .216 Without making any
further inquiry, Dr. West ordered a search of all students' bookbags and pocket-
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these instructions."' One teacher told students to stand by their desks and place
the items in their bookbags and purses on top of their desks. 39 He then looked into
the emptied purses.24 Another teacher placed her hand into a student's purse, but
did not find a "Walkman" inside. 41
About one month later, a teacher reported to Dr. West that she had smelled mar-
ijuana smoke in two hallway areas near the school cafeteria. 42 Classes were in
progress at the time, and no students were in the halls.2  Dr. West immediately
went to the hallway areas and detected a strong odor of marijuana. 2" He looked
for physical evidence but found none.245 Again, he ordered a search of all students'
pocketbooks and bookbags, and of male students' pockets. 2" During this search,
one of the students was required to empty her purse onto a teacher's desk, exposing
some tampons to the view of the teacher and nearby students. 247 Another teacher
sniffed one student's hands to determine if that student's hands had the smell of
marijuana. 2'I Students were required to turn their pockets inside out and place the
contents on top of their desks. 249
An interesting point found in the case, but not stated in the introductory prob-
lem, is that of the teacher taking the hands of a student and sniffing them to see if
the student had been smoking marijuana.2"' The court found that this was not a
"search"251 because school children do not have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the air surrounding their person.152 Therefore, school officials may sample
the air for the purpose of maintaining a proper learning environment to the same
extent that they would be justified in conducting a purely visual inspection.253 To
permit teachers to sniff student hands for the odor of marijuana is beyond the com-
prehension of this writer, and this fact alone would cause one to believe that this
Virginia federal court was following the general pattern that we have seen in the
other cases.
But the court held that the searches conducted by the other teachers violated the
Fourth Amendment.25 4 To conduct searches of students' pockets and bags for felt-
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individual was improper.255 The court made a strong plea for the requirement of
individualized suspicion that might safeguard the students' privacy interests.
The school officials conducted searches in this case by having students empty their
pockets and by looking into their bags and desks.257 But the appellate court held
that to permit a search based merely upon the fact that a school rule had been vio-
lated by someone, when standing alone as in this case, serves merely as an invita-
tion to an impermissibly broad search .25
The court further stated:
Such a result might indeed enhance the principal's stated goal of increased order in
the school. However, neither the Constitution nor its primary guardian - the federal
judiciary - should bow to expediency. The constitutional rights of all citizens should
be affirmed and protected in spite of any systemic discomfort created by mandating
respect for those rights. Even though it is easier and more effective, from a school
administrator's point of view, to be able to authorize general searches without the
burden of individualized suspicion, this Court finds no genuine, material issue of
fact as to the claimed unconstitutionality of the searches under consideration, and
holds that plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment thereon.259
This aspect of Burnham v. West provides a powerful argument in favor of adopt-
ing individualized suspicion as part of the reasonable suspicion standard of TL. 0.
In Burnham, the court gave the school officials qualified immunity based upon the
plaintiffs inability to show that the officials should have known that their actions
would violate the student's legitimate privacy interest.280 On appeal, the officials
were held to be protected from statutory liability by the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity.21 The court also refused to award punitive damages since sufficient evi-
dence was not introduced to demonstrate a "'reckless or callous indifference' or
'evil intent"' on the part of the school officials.262 The decision did order "any in-
junctive relief shown to be appropriate upon further proceedings."283
For a student to obtain any redress under a civil cause of action, it appears that
the burden of proof placed upon them is a nearly insurmountable obstacle. In most
cases, it would be difficult to show injury to personal property or that the officials
had ill will or malice toward the student. Few young students would avail themsel-
ves of the remedy of self-help, i.e., resisting the search, when they have been
taught to respect their elders and not to question authority. Therefore, the addition
of the element of individualized suspicion is even more compelling. School offi-
cials must learn that they are permitted to search only where there is individual-
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1166.
257. Id. at 1163.
258. Id. at 1166.
259. Id. at 1168.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. (quoting Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1987)).
263. Bumham, 681 F. Supp. at 1169.
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ized suspicion that a particular student has violated the law or a school rule and
evidence of that violation will be discovered by conducting a search. Most teach-
ers are dedicated and want "to do the right thing." The addition of the element of
individualized suspicion will assist school officials to properly conduct searches
and will lessen violations of students' privacy.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
TL. 0. is the law of the land, but its lack of clarity remains a problem for school
officials and lower courts. The burden is of utmost importance for school officials
because most cases of school searches will never come to court. The Supreme
Court has reduced the standard for searching school students from probable cause
to reasonable suspicion. This standard must be understood by school officials be-
fore students are searched. The official must be able to articulate a degree of cer-
tainty that a violation of either a school rule or criminal law exists before legally
invading a student's right to privacy.284 Teachers are just as capable as law enforce-
ment officers, or even more so, in making determinations as to what degree of cer-
tainty equals "reasonable suspicion" which will enable them to legally invade a
student's privacy.26
In applying the reasonable suspicion standard of TL.O. ,266 school officials
must remember that general searches are illegal. School officials must clearly un-
derstand that the element of individualized suspicion must be present before stu-
dents are searched. 267 They must consider the necessity and purpose of the search
and weigh the extent of the invasion upon the student.268 They must clearly under-
stand that the standard requires a nexus between the search and evidence to be
found due to a violation of a substantial school rule or the criminal law. 269
To assist in a determination of whether a "reasonable suspicion" to search ex-
ists, courts have considered several factors to be relevant. A search may be per-
missible in its scope and objectives as it relates to such factors as the age and sex of
the student and nature of the infraction being investigated .27' Lower courts have
considered the child's history and school record,271 the prevalence and seriousness
of the drug or violence problem in the school,272 the exigencies in conducting a
264. Justice Brennan warned in TL. 0. that the vague reasonableness test of the TL. 0. majority will create
uncertainty as to what constitutes a proper basis for searching, which will in turn create either undue restraint or
excessive eagerness in conducting searches. New Jersey v. TL. 0., 469 U.S. 325, 367 (1985) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
265. Most teachers have advanced degrees, whereas few police officers have college degrees. Scholars of di-
verse viewpoints agree that the probable cause test is now the functional equivalent of a reason to suspect, or
substantial possibility standard, thus police officers and school officials are subject to the same standard. See Tra-
cey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1258, 1332 n.348 (1990) [hereinafter Maclin].
266. Burnham, 681 F. Supp. at 1164.
267. Id. at 1165.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
271. State v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383, 1387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
272. Doe v. State, 540 P.2d 827, 832 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975).
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search without delay and further investigation,273 and the particular teacher or
school official's experience with the student.274 There must be articulable facts
that provide reasonable grounds to search the student, and the search must further
a legitimate goal of school officials in the necessity to maintain school discipline
and order.27 With these factors present, school officials will conduct only legal
searches that comport to Fourth Amendment protections.
Justice White seems to approve the type of evaluation discussed above from his
statement in TL. 0. that the Court should balance "the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails. "276 He characterizes the values to be weighed as
follows: "On one side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate expec-
tations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government's need for
effective methods to deal with breaches of public order."27 This statement sug-
gests that the Court is engaging in a straightforward cost-benefit analysis. 27a In our
capitalist society, economic theory related to the conduct of school officials when
attempting to search students can be clearly explained and understood by school
officials.
Historically, states delegated power to local school officials to establish a proper
curriculum and reasonable rules for the education of children. This delegation is
often classified as the education and host functions of public schools, whereby
public school authorities have a duty to educate and protect children placed in their
charge. Implicit in their authority is the power for school officials to make rules to
govern student conduct. Often this authority transcends the power of even the par-
ent while the.child is in school. The decisions of school officials will be upheld
even when objections are made by parents to the application of a particular rule to
their child. The school rule will be enforced even though it may be found not to
fulfill parental desires.279 Because of the enormous authority granted school offi-
cials to make school rules, the need for the acceptance of individualized suspicion
is of utmost importance in drafting these rules.
School officials often have greater authority over children placed in their care
than do courts and law enforcement personnel. Often, school violations commit-
ted by students never come before judicial bodies, but are resolved within the con-
273. People v. Scott D., 315 N.E.2d 466,470 (N.Y. 1974).
274. State v. McKinnon, 558 P.2d 781, 784 (Wash. 1977).
275. State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1985).
276. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1967)).
277. Id.
278. This kind of balancing, as Professor Ronald Dworkin notes, is a particularly inappropriate methodology
in rights cases since it suggests that rights only exist when it is convenient for the society to recognize their exist-
ence. RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 92 (1977). It has been suggested that we should be skeptical
of the Court's use of classical utilitarian cost-benefit analysis as a basis for protecting rights as fundamental as
those raised by the Fourth Amendment. Donald Crowley & Jeffrey L. Johnson, Balancing and the Legitimate Ex-
pectation of Privacy, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 337, 350 (1988).
279. Stephen R. Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and
Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373, 379 (1969) [hereinafter Goldstein].
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fines of our schools.28 ° Possession of an item that violates a school rule justifies a
school-imposed punishment to foster respect for school rules and to modify the be-
havior of students violating the school rules. School authorities seem to prefer to
deal with school violations, including drug problems, through their own tech-
niques. They defer to police to solve problems, and in particular drug problems, to
a lesser degree than would be expected. Often the schools will notify the student's
parents and not police officers if contraband is seized. The school will use internal
means in order to reduce the likelihood of future transgressions.28 They may
compel a student to attend counselling or educational programs to correct anti-so-
cial behavior by the use of rehabilitation and education instead of punitive means.
For example, the school could have required T. L. 0. to attend classes discussing
the health risks resulting from smoking instead of bringing in the police and resort-
ing to the courts. Thus, the school could properly use both its education and host
functions to promote its established function, the education of children.2"2
Students spend approximately 180 days a year in school where they are subject
to school rules and regulations. Decision-making by boards of education charged
with the administration of public education is one of the most significant areas of
law in terms of its effect on the lives of individuals and groups in our society. 283 A
necessary condition to the validity of a school board rule is that it serve the educa-
tion and host functions of the school. 21 It is essential that school boards be aware
of the nature of their functions and of the appropriate criteria on which they can
rely to decide that the school interest overcomes that of other institutions in the
society.
Because of the immense grant of power to school officials, school rules must be
carefully drafted. Public school teachers and administrators are often between
competing and compelling interests, especially when they conduct personal
searches of students. On one side of the balance is the school official's duty to pro-
tect the health, safety and welfare of all the students. On the other side is the stu-
dents' constitutional right to be secure from unreasonable searches. Thus, school
officials should clearly know and understand the significance of individualized
suspicion because it is an essential element in conducting searches of students that
truly balance educational and societal needs. This is a delicate and difficult duty. It
is in the best interests of all concerned that school boards enact comprehensive
280. A recent study of serious crimes in inner-city Chicago elementary schools indicated that only 15% of
cases that required reports to the police by law were reported, and only one percent of these resulted in an arrest.
Julius Menacker, Getting Tough on School-Connected Crimes in Illinois, 51 EIuc. L. REP. 347, 351 (1989).
Menacker explains these percentages as reflecting frustration at the lack of conviction of the offenders. Id. An-
other explanation may be a reluctance on the part of the Chicago school authorities to bring criminal justice issues
into the schools, especially at the elementary school level. See also Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 869 F.2d
870 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing school policy of calling in police to search student cars suspected of concealing
drugs, only after both students and parents have refused to consent to a search).
281. Zane, supra note 110, at 393.
282. Id.
283. Goldstein, supra note 279, at 375.
284. Id. at 387.
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personal search policies that include the element of individual suspicion to protect
the interests of all parties. The question the majority in TL. 0. did not ask is
whether a democratic society wishes to inculcate the view that state agents may
invade freedom under the amorphous "reasonableness, under all the circum-
stances," without the element of individualized suspicion.285
The vast majority of American citizens attend public schools on their way to
adulthood.2"6 Every citizen and public official passes through the schoolroom, and
the values they learn there, they will take with them in life.287 If students are con-
ditioned by their observations and experiences, especially during their formative
school years, what types of impression must they have when searched at school
based on general grounds or on the violation of a trivial school rule? Such a back-
ground has to distort one's perception of constitutional rights and freedoms.288
To assure continued appreciation for our form of government and the bold steps
the framers took to guarantee our rights and freedoms, we must create in our stu-
dents these rights through example. 289
The Court's holding in TL. 0., without the element of individualized suspicion,
may seriously undermine the protection that the Fourth Amendment affords to all
individuals, including students. Since students are accorded full Fourth Amend-
ment protections outside schools,290 it seems absurd that those rights are trans-
formed at the school gates. The discrepancy is likely to cause confusion. Students
may seriously question the legitimacy and authority of a system that mandates at-
tendance, attempts to inculcate democratic values, and then fails to accord them
full constitutional protection.291 Such questioning may result in heightened antag-
onism between students and administrators rather than increased order in the
school environment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Justice Black's suggestion in Korematsu v. United States,29 2 that the forced in-
ternment of Japanese American citizens could be justified by a "pressing public
necessity,"293 should remind us how easy it is in times of felt crisis to overwhelm
the most fundamental of rights by claims of social utility. Drug abuse and violent
285. New Jersey v. T.L.O.,469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985). See Robert Berkley Harper, Has the Replacement of
"Probable Cause" with "Reasonable Suspicion"Resulted in the Creation of the Best of All Possible Worlds?, 22 AK-
RON L. REV. 13 (1988).
286. TL. 0., 469 U.S. at 385-86 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
287. Id.
288. "If the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of arbitrary methods destructive of personal
liberty, they cannot help but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly." TL. 0., 469 U.S. at 373-74 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
289. "[E]ducating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles
of our government as mere platitudes." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
290. James A. Flynn, Note, School Officials May Conduct Student Searches Upon Satisfaction of Reasonable-
ness Test in Order to Maintain Educational Environment, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 738, 753 (1984).
291. Id. at753 & n.114.
292. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
293. Id. at 216.
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crime in the schools have become major social problems even in our elementary
schools.294 But in this time of perceived danger due to substance abuse and vio-
lence, we should not develop to a state where constitutional rights are skewed to
protect society from this perceived danger.29 In reality, we are creating a great
danger by lowering constitutional protections.
School searches today must be based on the reasonable suspicion standard as
held by the Court in TL. 0. Although the Court did not expressly state that individ-
ualized suspicion must be included,296 courts should read this element as being
necessary for searches of school students. Also, school boards should address this
issue by providing rules and guidelines for school officials which require that there
be objective and articulable facts that give rise to the reasonable suspicion to jus-
tify the search of a particular student. School teachers and administrators must un-
derstand that prior to intruding upon the privacy interest of school students, they
must be able to articulate facts which would lead a reasonably prudent person to
suspect that a search was needed to find evidence of a school violation or a crime.
This is not a major requirement for our public educators who often have advanced
degrees, where a similar requirement is made for police officers in stop-and-frisk
situations by Terry v. Ohio. 297
The TL. 0. decision will be shaping our nation's tolerance for invasive govern-
mental actions in the next century. In light of the actions of lower courts discussed
in this article, individualized suspicion is not used by many school officials when
searching students. If this conduct continues, we will be facing a dilemma, be-
cause students may react to general searches with hostility to authority, and this
hostility will distort their interpretations of constitutional freedoms and govern-
mental integrity. They may leave our schools without a clear understanding of the
meaning of privacy and the protection granted from the government by the Fourth
Amendment. Without a proper understanding of the freedoms on which this na-
tion was founded, the "police state" discussed by George Orwell in his famous
novel may not be very many generations away. 298 Also, we may well see that the
rights granted to school children in TL. 0. without the element of individual suspi-
cion, may well be characterized as a Trojan horse, which looks protective, but
contains hidden dangers.299
294. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
295. Maclin, supra note 265, at 1333-34. Professor Saltzburg stated: "It is understandable that the judicial
branch of government would want to join with the other two in fighting against the use of illegal drugs." Saltz-
burg, suprm note 194, at 3.
296. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8.
297. 392 U.S. 1,27-28 (1968).
298. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
299. Mary-Ellen Zalewski, Note, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Qualified Fourth Amendment Rights for Public School
Students, 64 OR. L. Rav. 727, 738 (1986).
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